Iraq Study Group Report
The Iraqi Study Group report can be read here. My principal reactions to it are in an Exclusive to Pajamas Media piece, so I can't reproduce it here. However, here are a few more observations that are exclusive the Belmont Club. The ISG recommendation is in the first column and my comments are in the second.
|"The Iraqi government must
send a clear signal to Sunnis that there is a place for them in national
life. The government needs to act now, to give a signal of hope. Unless
Sunnis believe they can get a fair deal in Iraq through the political
process, there is no prospect that the insurgency will end. To strike
this fair deal, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people must address
several issues that are critical to the success of national
reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq."
RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.
|How will the Shi'a regard this? More to the point, why will Iran, soon to be part of the ISG's Iraq International Support Group, even hear of it?|
|RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive.||I kept making the point in the Pajamas Media Exclusive that the Iraq International Support Group, the club of everyone who has participated in formenting disorder in that country, is now being given leave, indeed invited to participate in the internal affairs of Iraq. This is Exhibit A.|
|RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty.
Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at
national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding
ways and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.
RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.
|I think that embedded in this phrase is a recommendation to give amnesty to all those who have killed or kidnapped American troops and estopping the US public from objecting.|
|RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success.||And what does the ISG think "insurgents and militia leaders" will say once asked their opinion on the future US force presence? This recommendation seems like an absurdity; it puts the fate of US forces in the hands of its enemies, just so that the US can talk to them. Why?|
|RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.||When has this ever worked? Oh I forgot. It works in Lebanon, where Syria, a future member of the Iraq International Support Group is also involved in settling the internal affairs of a war-torn country.|
|RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.||The point of the whole exercise, in case you thought it was bringing peace to Iraq or peace to the Middle East.|
I could go on, but this is enough for now.