A closer look at the targeted mosque makes me think that the ramifications of this massacre can possibly be much worse than the immediate death and pain this terror attack brought, the Buratha mosque is not an ordinary mosque, it has a special religious value for Shia Iraqis as it's thought to be one of the places where Imam Ali stayed and prayed. But that's not the most important thing because this mosque is of considerable political significance, the preacher in this mosque is Jalal Addin al-Sagheer, a cleric from the SCIRI who was the first SCIRI member to publicly urge Ibrahim al-Jafari to withdraw his nomination for office. This mosque is one of the headquarters of the SCIRI and its clerical wing in Baghdad, even that Abdul Aziz al-Hakeem's son Ammar al-Hakkem preaches occasionally in this mosque when sheikh Jalal is not available.
Omar goes on to speculate who might have done it and comments on the diabolical cleverness with which it was executed.
Let's also take a look at the planning for the attack that is very well studied too, the suicide bombers did not start striking during Friday prayers when the place is usually heavily guarded and security personnel are at high alert but the first strike came more than 15 minutes later when an attack is less expected and after guards felt they accomplished their mission in protecting the worshippers during the main ceremony to be followed by the other two bombings that took advantage of the state of panic created by the first bombing. This in addition to the use of disguise has of course made the breach easier to make.
Apparently Coalition intel knew something was up, but didn't know the specific target. Bill Roggio says:
The attack in Baghdad followed a warning from the Interior ministry that "it received intelligence that insurgents were preparing to set off seven car bombs in Baghdad." The ministry "cautioned people in Baghdad to avoid crowds near mosques and markets due to a car bomb threat." The only good news that can be taken out of this is the Iraqi security forces' intelligence seems to be improving, as this attack was anticipated, but not enough to the point where this specific attack could have been deterred.
It's tempting to speculate extensively but it is probably best to stay on safe ground. The mosque attack may well be connected with the political wrangling within the SCIRI in relation to the formation of a unity government. And it increasingly looks -- "looks" being an uncertain term -- like the shape of the fight is changing away from encounters between insurgents and coalition forces (such as in Falluja) to something that looks like the Battle of Algiers, pre-war Shanghai and Prohibition-era Chicago all rolled into one, but relocated to Baghdad with the addition that some of the gangs have international backing. With the MSM providing the play by play.