Easter weekend open post 2
The New Republic has second thoughts about blaming Donald Rumsfeld after discovering that individual Generals also made "mistakes" in fighting the counterinsurgency. Spencer Ackerman uses the difference between the Marine, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne methods in Iraq to discredit the criticisms of General Swannack.
OK, General Swannack. I understand you want to oust Donald Rumsfeld from the Pentagon ... Secretary Kettle, meet General Pot. When Swannack commanded the 82nd Airborne in Iraq in 2003--which had responsibility for the western part of what was then called the Sunni Triangle--the discriminating application of force that marks counterinsurgency wasn't exactly his calling card. Perhaps most significantly, in April 2003, the 82nd handled a protest in Falluja by firing into the crowd, and while the situation was by all accounts a tremendously confusing one for well-intentioned U.S. soldiers, Fallujan sympathy for the then-nascent insurgency immediately took root. In March 2004, the Marines took responsibility for Anbar Province and set to work reversing Swannack's force-over-politics approach.
Ackerman implies that Swannack used too heavy-handed an approach. He quotes author George Packer (who wrote a feature article in the New Yorker praising success at Tal-Afar) to contrast the 82nd not only from the Marines but also from its sister Army unit, the 101st.
In the first year of the war, in Falluja and Ramadi, Major General Charles Swannack, of the 82nd Airborne Division, emphasized killing and capturing the enemy, and the war grew worse in those places; in northern Iraq, Major General David Petraeus, of the 101st Airborne Division, focused on winning over the civilian population by encouraging economic reconstruction and local government, and had considerable success. "Why is the 82nd hard-ass and the 101st so different?" Hammes [a retired Marine colonel] asked. "Because Swannack sees it differently than Petraeus. But that's Sanchez's job. That's why you have a corps commander."
The New Republic article concludes:
All this is to say that when it comes to counterinsurgency, and the Iraq war more generally, not all the failure, and the blame, lies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And after writing that, I feel like I need a shower ...
But this is slightly unfair to Swannack. There were always a multiplicity of approaches to the counterinsurgency, not only with respect to place but also to time. In Bing West's No True Glory, an account of both battles of Fallujah, West recounts how the Marine approach to the Fallujah problem shifted over time. At first the Marines tried dealing with the sheiks using reconstruction money. They later discovered the sheiks were ineffective and found that the Imams were pulling the strings. After several iterations, the Marines were prepared to use force to clear out the city, but were prevented from doing so because it would split up the Provisional Government. Balked, they tried using Saddam-era Generals to contain the growing terrorist cells in the city only to discover these men had lost their former influence to newly arrived foreign terrorist cells. In the end the Marines assaulted through Fallujah, killing and capturing the enemy. But wait, wasn't that what Swannack wanted to do in the first place? Maybe Swannack's timing was wrong. Maybe. But how do we know?
"There is a tide in the affairs of men ...". We are all familiar with the quote, which signifies in this context that the correct approach may vary in place and time. Ecclesiastes puts it even better than Shakespeare, one of the few instances when the Bard is trumped.
To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven
A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance ...
A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.
And a time to understand that this is so. The men who judge what works in their area of operations are the Commanders. Sometimes they will be wrong and sometimes get it right. The only demand one can make of command going up the line is to learn from their subordinates' experience and reflect it downward in changed guidance. The failure to adapt is the ultimate command failure. Stupidity was not sending men into the face of machine gun fire in August 1914 when that weapon was encountered in large numbers for the first time. What was stupid was to keep doing it even in the Somme in 1916. For that reason the New Republic's article, though slightly off-base puts its finger on the most disturbing aspect of the debate over the War. The press has made consistency in the prosecution of war a virtue; just as it has made the "failure" to live up to the initial plan the ultimate sin. In consequence so much of the debate consists of archaeology. What George Bush said to Tony Blair in Downing Street. What Joe Wilson heard in Darfur. Yet consistency in war is often not virtue but vice. The hobgoblin of small minds.
posted by wretchardthecat at 4/15/2006 04:36:00 PM
47 Comments:
All these generals speaking out now wouldn't have anything to do with the Democratic strategy disclosed about a month ago that the Republicans and the Bush Administration could be attacked by military speaking out against it, could it? ... Nah.
Even at the end of victorious wars there are always a spate of books by knowledgeable people arguing how things had been botched. Intelligence failures at Pearl; the torpedo scandal; Peleilu; Buckner's inability to detect Ushijima's fallback on Okinawa; the late attack on Iwo Jima; the decision to A-Bomb Japan; the belated decision to use submarines primarily against Japanese merchant shipping; the failure to convoy coastal American shipping during the U-Boat Happy Time; the failure to replace the Sherman tank; Eisenhower's fixation with the National Redoubt. Etc. And during the Cold War, too. Douglas McArthur was probably the ultimate military critic of policy. "There is no substitute for victory", he famously said. George Kennan, where are you to defend yourself?
Many of these criticisms (the failure to replace the Sherman tank, for example) were doubtless valid. But going from admitting individual errors to concluding that FDR messed up World War 2 or Truman lost Korea is not quite so straightforward. It's more complex than that.
The best cure for a bellyache is a good kick in the ass.
I think we could appreciate a little more consistency from General
'Rumsfeld is a man with the courage and the conviction to win the war on terrorism.' Batiste.
lawyers, guns & money, pb, that's what you'll be needing, talkin like that.
Hell, I'm still waitin' for your belated visit.
Must be that Boston water, you & JFKerry, no, wait, maybe it was the water in Cambodia.
As socljim points out:
This was all part of Reid's playbook distributed some time ago.
Was really lame and wouldn't work as written (demonstrations at Military Bases & etc) but with the help of the Retired Generals (6 of the 9 thousand, anyhow)/MSM Complex, book publishing, and etc, it got some traction.
If it was the fragility of the govt responsible for the Fallujah I Debacle, it would seem that the Bremmer year long recess on setting up an Iraqi govt bears some responsibilty.
(but I've been saying that for years)
6:28 PM,
Oh yeah, and Romney signed the Compulsory Insurance Law last week with TEDDY K.
Hell, ted's had more input into fiscal expenditures since '01 than GWB.
A little more ruthlessness in the domestic wars would have been appreciated, say 1 or 2 vetos, at least.
What is astonishing to me is how people do not recall what really happened a relatively few years back. Or that they accept patent absurdities in "the record."
To use another WWII example, the idea that the Luftwaffe lost a wonderful opportunity when Hitler ordered the Me-262 jet fighter built as a bomber is accepted as gospel. The reality is that the Germans could never have produced enough jets to affect the outcome of the war. And no one ever thinks about the fact that all the other German fighters were built in fighter-bomber versions without any problem at all - and those were all much smaller and less powerful aircraft compared to the Me-262.
One of the great things about the military is that people will all unquestioningly work toward a common mission. One of the worst things is that such lack of questioning often is taken as a virtue.
One of Adm Nelson's most trusted sea captains was quoted as saying "If I see an man who looks like he is thinking, I consider that an act of mutiny." In the midst of battlefield events such an approach may be necessary. But in the immediate post-op analysis it is incompetance. And done in the historical analysis is is a outright crime.
rwe,
I asked before, but you might have missed it:
Have you ever met, or heard of an "Alan" in Honolulu?
He's a walking WWII Naval Encyclopedia.
Grew up there through Pearl.
Wretchard,
Long ago you linked to a site with a detailed history of Ushijima/US encounter.
(the 'Kuri Line' or something I can't recall)
Haven't been able to find it in google.
(Even when I had the correct name for that line!)
Doug: No I have not heard of Alan.
Guy I know was at PH for the attack; his dad was in the Navy then.
By the way, I wonder how many people know that the 7 Dec 41 attack was only the first one. The Japanese did another bombing attack a few months later.
The one constant in the GWOT has been the Bush's Cabinet's and the Military's constant adaptation to changing circumstances. A very, very notable habit that is a joy to watch.
Wretchard - you forget the two biggest blunders in the East from WWII - the failure to close the Falaise-Argentan gap - and the British failure to advance beyond Nijmegin. Eisenhower pursued a Broad Front strategy despite much evidence to the contrary that it was not working and was too costly.
The Me-262 jet was fast, but the P-51 mustang had better acceleration than the 262 over much of the flight envelope and was more manueverable. The Mustang also outgunned the 262 and had better range.
___To the Generals
A fanatic is one who can't change his mind and won't change the subject.
He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator.
___To the Critics
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.
___To Iran, UN, et al
For there is no question but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war.
Cannoneer No.4 : I love talking to WWII veterans. I have written two magazine articles based on the experiences they have recounted to me. But one has to be careful to not accept them as experts on every aspect. Just because they never heard about something - or heard it a certain way - does not indicate truth. And I have heard a few things that are absolutely incredible and largely contradict the historical record. An assasination attempt we tried on Rommel, for example. And the circumstances surrounding the crash of the YB-49 that killed Capt Edwards.
Then there are personal experiences I have had where military people tried to "document" what happened -very much to their own advantage.
Bobalharb: Yes, a couple of 4 engined seaplanes, Emily flying boats, I think. At night. Dropped the bombs in the mountains. I think they launched from Wake Island.
1 OT on the other invasion:
---
MEXICO CITY (AP) -- The number of children deported from Arizona after U.S. agents caught them crossing the border illegally or found them in the desert more than doubled in the first three months of 2006, Mexico's Interior Department said on Friday.
However, some border analysts say they have witnessed what appears to be a general migrant rush to reach the United States.
They say the migrants appear to be motivated by immigration bills under discussion in the U.S. Congress that could legalize some illegal migrants and increase border security.
Loureiro said he has not seen such a rush of migrants since 1986, when the United States allowed 2.6 million illegal residents to get American citizenship.
---
Yet some otherwise intelligent folks ask:
"What's wrong with Amnesty?"
...and of course,
"Why Enforce Laws?"
Red River: Few people realize it, but the P-51 had the smallest engine of any WWII U.S. fighter. Its engine was smaller than those in the airplanes it replaced, in some cases well over 50% smaller. It even was smaller than the engines in the airplanes we considered to be obsolete when the war started. The later Mustang models even had smaller engines than the early ones.
By 1941 everyone in the world figured out what a fighter of sufficient performance had to have - and then the Mustang came along and proved all of them wrong!
P-51 in-line liquid-cooled Rolls-Royce engine was a different baby than the big Wasp radials that backboned the US aircraft inventory. Me-262, I don't see how it could be considered out-gunned by P-51s 6 fifties, tho, as it carried two 30 mm cannon plus 2 or 4 other smaller guns. It threw more wt of shot per unit time than our P-47 (I read somewhere), which had eight of the same fifties that P-51 had six of.
Or as Eric Hoffer put it:
"Free men are aware of the imperfection inherent in human affairs, and they are willing to fight and die for that which is not perfect. They know that basic human problems can have no final solutions, that our freedom, justice, equality, etc. are far from absolute, and that the good life is compounded of half measures, compromises, lesser evils, and gropings toward the perfect. The rejection of approximations and the insistence on absolutes are the manifestation of a nihilism that loathes freedom, tolerance, and equity."
See,
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Summary Report
(European War)
September 30, 1945
Separately, as I recall, Galbraith reported that he believed German war production actually peaked in 1944. Germany could build its jets; it just couldn't get them out of the factories and into the air. The unavailability of trained pilots is another issue entirely.
rufus, 8:43 PM
More worrisome still is that NYT security expert Richard Clarke is predicting wrath of G-d stuff. Even more important to Clarke than Armageddon, the Europeans, the NYT, and he will howl, scowl, and be generally unpleasant. Next thing you know, Brzezinski and Scowcroft will write an editorial signed by a bunch of Saudi (strike Saudi; add retired) generals.
Austin Bay has an interview with Hugh Hewitt on Rumsfeld. Colonel Bay says that there is disagreement and personality conflict all the time. The bottom line is that top command consists of people who really believe in their way of doing things. For example, General Zinni believed the sanctions were working. Bay says that a reasonable person might disagree. Read the whole thing.
rufus,
You talk'n bout TarNAYders?
You know,
You say potato
I say pa TATE er
You say tomato
I say ta MADE er
8:47 PM
Aw, that's just
The Conventional Wisdom tm
rufus,
This site has a map of Iran referencing the Iraq-Iran War
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/conflicts%2058%20east/conflicts%20east%20%20pages/wars%20conflicts%20east%20%20map%2054.htm
The oil fields and the strength of the Kurds in northern Iraq interested me.
Faster Please?
Why can't we all just git along?
rufus,
Another good map
http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/KHUZESTAN.gif
rufus,
I pulled the http. I'm having the same problem with retrieval. I'll see what I can do.
ME 262 was not committed to fight the P-51.
They were expected to swarm on B-24 and B-17 boxes. Hence their guns were optimized for the anti-bomber profile.
The P-51 could only tangle with the ME 262 shortly after takeoff and during the landing approach.
ME 262 pilots were instructed to avoid combat with the P-51. Why take down a nimble one-pilot platform when you can shoot up a crew?
4 30mm Mk 108 guns is a massive array for the period.
The German mistake was to try and re-engineer the Jumo 4 engine away from strategic materials -- all at the last minute -- even though it was given AAA priority by Speer.
The move away from chrome and nickel ruined the Jumo 4. Typical engines would last only 10 to 20 flight hours. The result is that many a plane was shot up on the ground waiting for its engines. Shockingly few ever flew.
It was the engines that created all of the problems. They were on the critical path. Nothing else ever was. The decision to save on critical materials killed the program. The original engines would have been much more available at least eight months earlier. Lasting much, much longer, each engine would have kept a much larger jet force in the sky against the heavies.
I’ve never heard of a single account wherein an American pilot could tag a full speed ME 262. They could out climb, out dive and out run out best at all working altitudes.
Other follies: not supplying the ME 262 with better fuel: diesel, kerosene, or METHANOL. Methanol would allow the Germans to chill down the exhaust so that the plane could operate from any airport, not just the concrete ones. Methanol would extend the engine life remarkably. All that would be required would be larger tankage. Adding such volume was routine for all designs. ( P-51, P-47, FW190, TA-152 )
Night fighters would have greatly benefited from methanol since it produces no flaming exhaust. Synthesizing methanol is one thing the Germans could do even late into the war. It’s a quick step from water-gas, already a mass produced commodity.
Maybe we could start a
Happy Armchair Warrior Brigade.
rufus,
"Yet, he NEVER DID think that we were really coming. This looks awfully similar to me."
I have the recurring thought that the problem the Iraqis had and the Iranians are having understanding the US is that they know nothing about America, i.e. red-state America.
Is it possible that Iran is informed only by its experience with the American elite, i.e. the Chomskyites of the left? Consider, unlike the EU, most Islamic immigrants to the US are professionals. Their associations with Americans will be in the main, thereby, with other professionals, bureaucrats, academicians, etc. They have probably never heard of a Tar-Nay-er or a pu-tator. Moreover, I suspect that most Iranians trained or educated in the US or by Americans have been very sheltered. In short, the Iranians are thinking Capote, not Arnold.
rufus,
For first map, try
http://www.dean.usma.edu/
Departments
Academic Departments
History
International History
Our Atlases
Go to Atlases
Wars and Conflicts Since 1958 Eastern Hemisphere
rufus,
For the second map, try
http://academic.evergreen.edu/
g/grossmaz/KHUZESTAN.gif
By physically typing it in, I pulled up the map.
The Germans could not build enough Me-262's to affect the war because it required high-nickle alloys for the engines. And they had no source of such nickel alloys, period. What little they could scrape up had to go for building tank armor and other essentials.
They did not use turbosuperchargers for their aircraft for the same reason. They used a "cold cycle" approach for the engines for the Me-163 and V-2 for the same reason.
Building the Me-262 engines out of lower-grade materials led to a very short life. That meant you had to build more of them, which made the production problem worse in some respects.
A Mustang could in fact outdive a Me-262 because it had a superior, low drag airfoil that delayed the effects of compressibility.
Given the low numbers available, the only thing the Me-262 was good for was as a bomber, ala the F-117. It was uninterceptable.
Meanwhile, the Ford Willow Run factory was building B-24's at a rate of ONE PER HOUR. And there were 2 more factories building those same airplanes - and that is just B-24's. And North American and Grumman were literally in race to see who could build more fighters in one factory. They were each building 15-20 fighters A DAY.
From just 3 factories, the U.S. could build an entire bomber squadron, a USAAF fighter squadron and a USN fighter squadron about every 24 hours.
rwe:
I heard Hewitt and the Frank Gafney say Iran's Industrial base is the equal of ours in WWII, and my jaw dropped.
...don't think they could match your numbers, or Kaiser's Concrete Ships, for that matter!
...not to mention the Plywood PT's down in Louisiana.
...and the population of the USA was what in 1943?
Great Link, Bennet.
Note that Conway was also upset at being ordered to STOP.
...not exactly a great example of letting the folks on the ground who KNOW, make the decisions.
It'll be another 40 years before we get a dispassionate history of these events and the people.
What's obvious is that the 90s end-of-history and peace-dividend redirection of critical defense funds to welfare programs drove the best-and-brightest out of government service, and the military especially. It's not that the people that remained were bad people, they just were seldom A players, and the A players that remained were rewarded for appearing to be B players (i.e. get along, conform to processes rather than demonstrate great intellect and judgment). If anything, the Rumsfeld beginning resembled a corporate "take-over," inserting a few new people, but mostly close-order coaching and sorting of the existing staff to bolster the A players and remove the Bs. (yes, Bs and BS).
If I had a dollar for every time Rumsfeld mentioned "we have an adaptive, learning and smart enemy.." I'd be rich. Which means this war will be especially cruel to a military leadership that thought that their only metrics were process (and playing "by the book") v. taking risks. I'm surprised half the generals aren't in revolt. Then again, Rumsfeld and company are surprisingly good coaches.
Yes, I mean "critical" defense funds in spite of the obvious waste. Our system of government seldom permits common-sense trades of a military-base against, say, a satellite. There are far too many voters affected by closing a base. What we can do to compensate is do both, sacrificing transfer-payments which are a nice-to-have for a must have, our mutual security - unless we have children-in-charge who are more interested in feeling good about themselves than doing what's right. But even this passes (as Rumsfeld says - " he trusts in the American people's "center" ") as the electorate occasionally is roused from looking after the country's business, i.e. their enterprise, to their common interests.)
" What we can do to compensate is do both, sacrificing transfer-payments which are a nice-to-have for a must have, our mutual security "
---
Great post Ari.
Disagree on details:
If fiscal and security needs are not even taken into account, most of the transfer payment programs are destructive by themselves.
The providers become corrupt power hoarders, and the recipients become shameless leeches.
Add an "education" system that teaches entitlement, selfishness, and disdain for all things great, and you have a recipe for the destruction of the country as it is.
Now we add uneducated net consumers of services in unlimited supply via Mexico, give them a grievance/victim mentality to match their heritage, and pretend we are not destroying the country.
re: transfer payments as essentially corrosive and destructive to all, esp. if there's no sense of obligation in return, just "entitlement."
I vehemently agree, Doug.
But we seem to be divided about half-and-half as a nation, half of us with motherly instincts towards redistribution as being only fair ("Johnny, share with your little brother, I don't care if he has more than you!"), irrespective of the real and psychic damage this does, and half with fatherly instincts ("What? you're a 17 year-old dropout and still in the house?!... Mother, I thought we agreed to change the #$@! locks).
And lacking a backbone in the judiciary to enforce the constitution as written, a democracy is near guaranteed to result in what we have until such time as we realize what harm we do, and tire of limiting our children's futures and quality-of-life.
Larsen said:
" Me-262, I don't see how it could be considered out-gunned by P-51s 6 fifties, tho, as it carried two 30 mm cannon plus 2 "
The P51 outguns the 262 because the 51 carried six .50 cal with over 1800 rounds at a high rate of fire with high velocity.
The 262 carried mk108 30 mm with 50 rounds that were low velocity. The Mk103 was unreliable but had a higher velocity, but the ballistics were still inferior to the .50 cal.
The net result is that the P51 could engage at a much longer range from all aspects, use snap shots, and put lead in a much larger volume. The 262 had to get very close from the rear to use its cannon effectively.
The 51 outgunned the 262.
The 262 pilots were told not to tangle with the P51s because in a typical dogfight, 51s would shoot them down.
Given the same speed, the Jumo engine could not rapidly spool up to pull away from the 51 across much of the envelope. The 51 enjoyed a relative short-lived advantage in that it could change its speed faster that the 262 across much of the flight envelope.
With the large engines on its wings, the 262 could not match the 51 in either an energy or manuevering engagement because it could not change its roll or its yaw as quickly as the 51.
Furthermore, the 51 carried a lot more ammo that had a much greater effective range than the 262.
Not a pretty picture. The only thing a 262 pilot could do is point his nose at the ground and extend.
Red River: Well, that is all pretty much true - although a reasonably smart 262 pilot would never get slow enough to have to spool up his engines, except on landing.
One of the biggest problems with the 262 was that control forces were so high that the pilot had a lot of trouble maneuvering at high speed. The control stick had a hinge in it that allowed the pilot to unfold an extra section and gain more leverage. The 262 could not turn as tight as a 51 but it could fly around a larger circle so much faster that the 51 that in a turn they were about equal. Of course, given the jet's short range, they could not do this for very long, and as airspeeds quickly decayed in the turn the 51 got closer to pulling a lead. There was only going to be one outcome unless the jet ran for it early.
An extendible Stick!
Those Krauts sure were clever.
Maybe a'49 Buick should have had a larger diameter steering wheel in reserve.
...I preferred my air-cooled 36 hp behind the rear axle, however.
But I was fearless then.
There's almost zero cases (that I can find) of 51 and 262 dogfighting--the faster plane has the choice to fight or flee, and the 262 was a bomber-killer by design and order. So, the dogfight superiority has no real answer. Gunnery again is problematic, as either plane had a short-burst kill power, and ranging--important againt bombers--wouldn't count for much between two fixed gun forward-firing fighters. The 30 mm cannon shell was explosive and a hit almost anywhere was going to make the target unflyable. The 262 could take some fire and live (it did), nothing could take a 30 mm and survive except if the hit was in a very lucky place. 51 turned out to be a 262-killer via the tactic of staying above the bases and hitting them landing and taking off. Pretty close to apples and oranges in WWII same-generation fighter aircraft, all in all.
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