The New York Times
asks the question: "Have Pakistani intelligence agencies been promoting the Islamic insurgency?" And the answer is, probably and for the following reason:
Western diplomats in both countries and Pakistani opposition figures say that Pakistani intelligence agencies — in particular the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence — have been supporting a Taliban restoration, motivated not only by Islamic fervor but also by a longstanding view that the jihadist movement allows them to assert greater influence on Pakistan's vulnerable western flank.
More than two weeks of reporting along this frontier, including dozens of interviews with residents on each side of the porous border, leaves little doubt that Quetta is an important base for the Taliban, and found many signs that Pakistani authorities are encouraging the insurgents, if not sponsoring them. The evidence is provided in fearful whispers, and it is anecdotal. ...
One former Taliban commander said in an interview that he had been jailed by Pakistani intelligence officials because he would not go to Afghanistan to fight. He said that, for Western and local consumption, his arrest had been billed as part of Pakistan's crackdown on the Taliban in Pakistan.
The frequency with which the words "Saudi Arabia" and "Pakistan" come up in connection with terrorist sponsorship is undeniable. In the global jihad
the difference between friend and foe is less often due to national and organizational affiliation as it is to personal belief. It is networks of personal loyalty or tribal and religious affiliation rather than such Western concepts as "nationality" or membership in a particular government department that determines actual behavior. The modern day jihadi
is like a ghost who walks through international and organizational boundaries where their enemies are stopped by them, often for legal reasons. Until we learn to walk through walls as they do, we will be operating at a disadvantage.