We Are Just As Bad As They Are

The University of Pittsburgh summarizes a report by General Richard Formica describing his concerns over certain interrogation practices used on terrorist suspects.

The released copies of the reports were heavily redacted, but show concern over practices such as stripping detainees, depriving them of sleep, assailing them with loud music, withholding food other than bread and water in some cases for up to 17 days, and altering their environmental conditions, suggesting they were kept too hot or too cold. The Formica report expressly concluded that some Iraqi detainees were not being treated in accordance "with the spirit of the principles set forth in the Geneva Conventions."

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The entire report (the parts which aren't blacked out at least) is here. It's about the CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations. What is the CJSOTF-AP and what does it do? BG Frank Kearny, Commander Special Operations Command Central Command tells an interviewer it is a Special Forces task force working with other agencies ("joint") and the forces of other nations to hunt down terrorists. There are task forces for different parts of the world. The CJSOTF-AP is the task force for the Arabian Peninsula.

CJSOTF-AP is focused on Iraq currently but also works with Jordanian SOF to assist in building the ISOF Brigade for the Iraqi Army. ... we work closely with the MOD counter-terrorist [CT] forces and SOF in many countries in the AOR. Some we partner with quietly and some in a more open manner. SOF forces from Jordan, Iraq, UAE and Bahrain have had direct involvement in OEF and OIF. The Iraqi ISOF Brigade is an excellent combat force which was created under the supervision of U.S. SOF and also assisted with initial entry training by our Jordanian partners. This is an excellent relationship, and it highlights the initiative between Jordan and the U.S. to create a SOF regional training center in Jordan, known as the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center [KASOTC], which will break ground for a new facility in the spring of 2006.

This unit is aimed at the hardest core of the enemy and it works together with non-Americans, particularly Iraqi and other Arab personnel. (It is interesting to note how deeply involved  Jordan, Iraq, UAE and Bahrain are in these operations) CJSOTF-AP is charged with training Arab forces which have a long history of torture to demonstrate a better way of doing things. The multinational composition of this unit will explain why non-Americans often figure in the Formica narrative. It may also explain why whole parts of the Formica report are blacked out. (As we will see, the censor missed a few things.)

A close reading of the Formica report itself shows that detainees were interrogated in the field, sometimes in places where they couldn't be safely transported to a secure base. "CJSOTF-AP units operate in a dangerous environment often located in high-threat areas ... convoy movements to transport or to interrogate detainees held at other locations are high risk tactical operations" (page 6). "These were not internment facilities, i.e. facilities intended for long-term detention, but rather temporary facilities for tactical interrogation facilities." (page 7) In one case (page 32) interrogation was carried out at a "safehouse", which suggests some interrogations may have taken place an insurgent-controlled locality.

Formica report concluded that some Iraqi detainees were not being treated in accordance "with the spirit of the principles set forth in the Geneva Conventions." In other words, that the Geneva Convention was being violated. It concluded that "insufficient training and unclear policy standards made abuses possible, and recommended appropriate changes in procedures for detainee handling. A Defense Department source told AP that the Formica report recommendations had all been implemented." The recommended changes focus on two areas. First, ensuring that detainees are only interrogated by trained men, who know what is permissible. Second, detainees were to be transported, within a very short period, to places of detention built to a minimum standard. These are easy to understand in light of the CJSOTF-AP multinational background and the fact that they operate in the field.

But not every allegation of abuse was true. The Formica Report finds that detainees often made up stories. That in fact, it was part of their counter-interrogation training. (page 30)

It has been common practice for detainees since last fall to claim abuse to gain their release ... or justify their confessions and incriminating statements about other insurgents ... Commanders indicate that there are reports that anti-Iraqi forces in the Adamiya neighborhood are being coached in counter-interrogation techniques. ....On 21 March 2004, detainee X who had been captured by X on 17 March 2004, alleged during an interrogation that was beaten by X and an Egyptian Police Officer. X had no physical signs of mistreatment. An interpreter overhead this detainee telling another detainee "to tell the Americans you were beaten and tortured and when you arrive at the detention facility they will release you."

This paragraph (apart from revealing the Egyptians as CJSOTF-AP participants and providing an insight into Baghdad's Adamiya neighborhood) provides a glimpse into the perception of what American policy was understood to be. An interpreter overhead this detainee telling another detainee "to tell the Americans you were beaten and tortured and when you arrive at the detention facility they will release you." Nevertheless, there were abuses which acknowledged succinctly at the bottom of page 7:

On 13 May 2004, the Commander of CJTF-7 issued a new CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. This new policy superseded the 12 October 2003 policy. The 13 May 2004 policy specifically prohibits the use of six interrogation techniques, including Sleep Management, Stress Positions, Change of Scenery, Dietary Manipulation, Environmental Manipulation and Sensory Deprivation. In all other respects the 13 May 2004 policy is identical to the 12 October 2003 policy. Because the new 13 May 2004 policy was not in effect during the relevant time period preceding the intiation of this investigation and for the sake of clarity, the 12 October 2003 policy will be referred to as the controlling CJTF-7 policy throughout this report.

Sleep Management, Stress Positions, Change of Scenery, Dietary Manipulation, Environmental Manipulation and Sensory Deprivation. Those were the activities which were found unacceptable. These techniques are exactly the problems noted in the Pittsburgh Law School in their summary of the Formica report. The relevant passage is repeated below.

The released copies of the reports were heavily redacted, but show concern over practices such as stripping detainees, depriving them of sleep, assailing them with loud music, withholding food other than bread and water in some cases for up to 17 days, and altering their environmental conditions, suggesting they were kept too hot or too cold. The Formica report expressly concluded that some Iraqi detainees were not being treated in accordance "with the spirit of the principles set forth in the Geneva Conventions."

Andrew Sullivan is contemptuous of the Formica report.

I haven't discussed the Formica Report because, even by the standards of the several previous reports, this one was such an exercize in transparent denial and avoidance it didn't merit discussion. But General Formica did what Rumsfeld wanted: no one was held responsible even for the abuses Formica did concede. That's the Bush principle. Torture, pretend to investigate, and exculpate. Rinse the blood off your hands and repeat.

To illustrate his point about the abuses that 'Formica did concede', he quotes Spencer Ackerman who says detainees were forced into small cells, kept there for days and that Formica believed it was OK to keep them there for 48 hours.

Spencer Ackerman asks:

Take all the shelving out of a typical filing cabinet. (My own office cabinet happens to be slightly smaller than the [4 feet high, 4 feet long and 20 inches wide] cell described here.) Now lock yourself in it for two days. You may notice you can neither stand up straight nor lie down, and crouching gets really uncomfortable extremely fast. Remember that as an Iraqi detainee, the Geneva Conventions apply to you. Now ask yourself: Why would Formica consider such treatment "reasonable" for two days? And if someone put an American soldier in such conditions for two days - or authorized doing so - what should happen to that person?

Ackerman illustrates what these cells were like from a New York Times report.

General Formica found that in the third case at a Special Operations outpost, near Tikrit, in April and May 2004, three detainees were held in cells 4 feet high, 4 feet long and 20 inches wide, except to use the bathroom, to be washed or to be interrogated. He concluded that two days in such confinement "would be reasonable; five to seven days would not." Two of the detainees were held for seven days; one for two days, General Formica concluded.

But it does actually help to read the report closely before dismissing them as "such an exercize in transparent denial and avoidance it didn't merit discussion". Let's revisit Ackerman's filing cabinet example. What the Formica report actually says about the incident (page 47) is this:

These detainees were held in small cells measuring 20 inches (wide) x 4 feet (high) x 4 feet (deep), that loud music was played a volume to prevent detainees from communicating with each other, and that X was employed as a method of setting favorable conditions for interrogation. ... These cells did not provide room for X to lie down or stand up. They were removed from the cells periodically for latrine breaks, to be washed, and for interrogations. A medical record indicates that X was removed on at least one occasion for a medical exam at X on the 5th day he was held in custody ... personnel indicated that detainees were not kept in the cells for 72 continuous hours. ... I find that these measures, while inappropriate for long-term detention, were determined by the X to be necessary for force protection and to prevent detainees from escape. It is reasonable to conclude that this would be acceptable for short periods of time, 24-48 hours, coincident to capture and until it was reasonably practicable to transfer them to a suitable facility -- two days would be reasonable; five to seven days would not.

We discover that cells were not purpose-built, like the 'Tiger Cages' of Vietnam to which they will doubtless be compared, but were field expedients used for three people, justified supposedly "for force protection and to prevent detainees from escape". We also learn it was unclear how long people were continuously kept in these cells -- not, if we believe personnel from the Task Force, longer than 72 hours straight -- and that in any event, they were removed periodically for latrine breaks, bathing and interrogations.

Sleep Management, Stress Positions, Change of Scenery, Dietary Manipulation, Environmental Manipulation and Sensory Deprivation have already been acknowledged as unacceptable treatment, even for the hard core of the enemy. But surely these tiny cells were as bad as anything the Nazis were capable of? The total volume available in these cells was 4' x 4' x 1.7'=26.7 cubic feet. For purposes of comparison, let's consider the 2006 Volkswagen GTI, which seats from four to five adults.

While the GTI may look compact on the outside, there's an amazing amount of room inside, some 94.2 cubic feet of passenger compartment volume ... The rear seat can hold three people, though it's best suited for two, who can get even more comfortable by tipping out the wide armrest that forms the center seatback. Those sitting in the back have both cup holders and storage cubbies for their stuff. There's plenty of rear legroom, at least when someone in, say, the 5-foot-10 range is occupying the front seat.

Five and four passengers in a 2006 Volkswagen GTI each get 18.84  and 23.1 cubic feet respectively, in both cases less than the volume available in the detainee cells. And you can neither stand nor lie down in the 2006 Volkswagen GTI either. How about the twenty inches in width, isn't that inhumanly narrow? I thought so too, until I looked at airline seats. The standard economy airline seat is 17.8" wide. Business class seats approach 20" and more. My own swivel chair is 18" wide. I measured it. Take out a ruler and measure your own chair if you are as incredulous as I was. For further comparison, consider the proposed A380 Airbus Standing Seat, in which short-distance passengers would travel literally lashed upright to their chairs.

 

The A380 Standing Seat
2.08' x 6' x 1.48'=18.5 cubic feet

 

General Formica was correct to condemn the cells in which those 3 were held as not being in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions. Formica believed it was permissible, for force protection and to prevent escape to keep them for up to 48 hours. You could do that under the stress of tactical necessity. He describes one of CJSOTF-AP's detainees as least 6'3" and very muscular.  But the airline seats shown above, comparable or smaller to the ones which held al-Qaeda suspects convey fat, elderly, pregnant and sometimes sick people and charge them hundreds of dollars for it. And while Formica's 48 hours is longer than the 18.5 hours which constitute the longest flights in the world, we are told the detainees could take latrine breaks and baths. It's uncomfortable; it's coercive; but is it torture? The point of this comparison is not to argue against the seriousness of torture, but to emphasize it. Torture is not just anything you want to call by that name. The CJSOTF-AP must demonstrate to most brutal regional special forces in the world how to get timely information out of the hardest of the enemy.  Unless they held those secret policemen back we would not be talking about  "Sleep Management, Stress Positions, Change of Scenery, Dietary Manipulation, Environmental Manipulation and Sensory Deprivation" which are disallowed under the new guidelines anyway. But what should the CJSOTF-AP do? The answer must be more than to ask the detainees for their name, rank and serial number. There has to be some level of coercive interrogation which can legitimately be applied, short of real torture or else we had better give the whole thing up. Andrew Sullivan may be correct when he implies these cells are intended for torture. That accusation can certainly be made but the charge is not proved and the fact it applied to three people is suggestive that it is not policy. It's too easy to speak in generalities; too easy to draw an equal sign between two undefined terms. When Andrew Sullivan writes:

I doubt whether even Donald Rumsfeld will describe what has been done to two young American soldiers as a "coercive interrogation technique." But you never know. Some people wonder why I remain so concerned about torture, and the surrender of our moral standing with respect to this unmitigated evil. Maybe the news of captured, tortured and murdered Americans will jog their conscience. Or maybe it will simply reinforce the logic of torture-reciprocity endorsed by Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Gonzales. As usual, complete silence from Instapundit. Almost radio silence from the Corner, except for the torture-advocate, Mark Levin, who is urging reciprocal atrocities. Give him points for consistency. And so the cycle of depravity and defeat deepens ...

He may be mistaken. And it is not depraved to disagree.